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SYMPOSIUM
THE CONTROL OF MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS IN A
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY: SOME THOUGHTS
CONCERNING THE ROLE OF
SOCIAL SCIENTISTS
MAURICE GARNIERj-
When sociology became a separate discipline, several individuals ob-
served that one form of social organization-bureaucracy-demanded
study because of its increasingly important role in modern societies, a
role likely to increase in importance over the foreseeable future. Weber,
Michels and others spent much of their effort analyzing bureaucracies, as
did Marx, who saw clearly that such a form of social organization would
play a central role in the transformation of bourgeois society.'
We can isolate two broad trends in the study of complex organiza-
tions. The theoretical seeks to understand and predict characteristics of
bureaucracies. The second, often the motive behind the first and here
termed the applied, seeks to understand bureaucracies for their social
relevance. Obviously, these two trends depend heavily on each other.
The distinction between them is one that involves the motivation of the
researcher more than anything else.
These trends still exist today. Military organizations are only one
special form of bureaucracy, and it is no accident that the two trends
described above-the theoretical and the applied-can be found among
those specializing in the study of military affairs. Yet, it must be ac-
knowledged that power, or more correctly control, is a concept absent
from most studies of the military. It is only very recently that this con-
cept has been reintroduced in the study of bureaucracies, military ones
in particular. "
The main criticism to be levied in this essay is that military sociol-
t Assistant Professor of Sociology, Indiana University.
1. See generally M. WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION
(1947); R. MICHELS, POLITICAL PARTIES: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE OLIGARCHAL
TENDENCIES OF MODERN DEMOCRACY (paperback ed. 1966). These theorists, and Michels
particularly, were concerned about the concentration of power in a few hands and the
implications of such concentration for a democratic form of government. While Michels
was more concerned with the problems of internal democracy, i.e., with the problem of
the control of a bureaucracy by its members, he nevertheless was explicitly aware of the
problem of external control, i.e., the problem of organizational control by outsiders.
This concentration of power caused bureaucracies to be perceived as agents of social
power and thus requiring study for very practical reasons. This is the perspective
taken in this paper.
2. See C. PERROW, COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS: A CRITICAL ESSAY 199-202 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as PERRow].
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ogists have failed to focus on military bureaucracies as centers of power.
Put differently, the concept of organization control as the term is usually
utilized, that is, how one controls an organization and not how members
of organizations are controlled, has been avoided.' By abandoning this
concern, sociologists have missed more than an opportunity to make theo-
retical contributions ;4 they have contributed to our understanding of mili-
tary organizations, and to our ability to manipulate them, to a far lesser
extent than they could have had they focused on this important concept.
It must be said, in all fairness, that in the study of organizations the gen-
eral notion of power has been consistently neglected (an omission that
sociologists of knowledge ought to study). Even a contemporary so-
ciologist who examines power relations within bureaucracies' fails to
point out that bureaucracies are also instruments of power (i.e., instru-
ments with which other organizations can be shaped and with which out-
comes can be made more likely to occur).6
Before presenting the details of our argument, our own bias should
be stated. This bias is that military organizations are only executors of
the will of elected representatives. In order for that will to be informed,
specialists in the usage of violence must be consulted, and the bureaucratic
phenomena that lead generals to recommend various policies (purchase
of certain weapons, given size of armed forces, etc.) must be fully under-
stood by those who will listen to such recommendations. In this way the
legislator's critical abilities will be maximized. The role of social sci-
entists is, therefore, to provide elected policy makers with the understand-
ing to appraise recommendations made to them, and to ensure implemen-
tation of their policy decisions by the organizations charged with execut-
ing them. In short, according to this view: (1) military organizations
are bureaucracies that must be controlled; (2) this control implies some
very specific behavior by policy makers; and (3) bureaucracies, as serv-
ants of the people, should not be abused by those governing them.
We can now examine a few major interests of, military sociologists
that document the failure of these researchers to consider power and con-
trol as relevant variables.' Likewise, we will briefly examine the work
3. See, e.g., Etzioni, Organizatio l Cotrol Structure, in HANDB00K OF ORGANIZA-
TIONS 650 (J. Marsh ed. 1965).
4. One goal which might be pursued is the linkage between theories of social and of
organizational control; the latter could thus be an intrinsic part of theories of social
organization.
5. M. CROZIER, THE BUREAUCRATIC PHENOMENON (1964).
6. PE low, vtprt note 2, noted this omission, but systematic empirical research fol-
lowing his general recommendations has yet to be published.
7. The assumption is that, if social scientists considered power, they would inevit-
ably consider control, and this is why we concentrate on control. Social scientists see
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of some political scientists and, finally, we will offer some suggestions.
The focus here emphasizes the practical contribution that social scientists
can make to the citizens' control over their governmental apparatus.
Nevertheless it includes as well the obvious point that purely theoretical
contributions can be made, and made significantly.
SOCIOLOGICAL QUESTIONS
It may seem strange that sociologists have ignored power when ex-
amining military, or any other, organizations. It is therefore necessary
to focus, if somewhat briefly, on the kinds of issues that sociologists have
probed when studying military organizations. It must be remembered
that this study did not really start until the Second World War. There-
fore, there is no reason to expect military sociologists to have done more
than, say, industrial sociologists, who are part of a much older specialty.
Put another way, some basic understanding and some basic facts had to
be gathered before a critical perspective could be applied to military
sociology.
Social Origins of Military and Political Leaders
Space forbids a systematic review of all that military sociologists
have written.8 Instead, we discuss several areas of study as examples of
the kinds of concern that have dominated the field. These examples show
that sociologists were not really consistent themselves. It can be assumed
that all of those who spent years studying military organizations were
committed to the notion of civilian control: they believed in a diffuse, and
perhaps not totally conscious, way that the military was an instrument
of the state and that the instrument was to be controlled by Congress and
the President. This premise was often forgotten, however, and sociolo-
gists embarked on investigations that were of no obvious use to social
planners. These investigations, however, were often useful to military
planners; and, while military and civilian requirements are not necessarily
in opposition, the danger exists that social scientists have become agents
of the military when, in reality, their beliefs should put them in the service
of elected officials.
One concern of military sociologists, which is clearly related to the
applied trend but which ignores considerations of control, has been that
of social origins. This concern has a long history. Basically it involves
control as an applied consideration, while power is a more theoretical concept (but one
with clear applied implications).
8. For a review of the literature, see generally K. LANG, MILITARY INSTITUTIONS
AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF WAa: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE WITH ANNOTATED BiBLIOG-
RAPHY (1972).
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the question whether certain elites, in this case generals and admirals,
come from a given social stratum or have been educated in certain institu-
tions. For purposes of historical analysis, or for exploring whether a
society is open or closed, this kind of question is obviously relevant. It
may be worthwhile to know that in Britain the army is slowly abandoning
the practice of recruiting officers from the nobility and gentry and that
France is experiencing the same trend. However, in order to understand
these trends, a relatively thorough awareness of the social context is neces-
sary. Knowing that a large proportion of generals comes from the no-
bility is not terribly useful; one must also know whether or not generals
are important policy makers, and that question is society-specific.
This focus on recruitment may stem indirectly from a concern with
control. In the Prussian military, which has influenced so many other
military organizations (the American in particular), the officers were
drawn from the nobility because of the policies initiated by Frederick
William I. As a result, some historians and sociologists have jumped to.
the conclusion that social origins, by fostering homogeneity within the
officer corps, facilitated control over the military. They have further
concluded that a homogeneous organization could more easily control the
state than could a military organization in which officers were from quite
heterogeneous backgrounds.' The fact is that the Prussian nobility's
control over the army and, in turn, the army's control over the whole
country resulted from several very specific circumstances, particularly the
impoverishment of the nobility.
Other circumstances have spawned control of military organizations
by one social group. England, for example, is a well-known case of an
army which draws most of its officers from the gentry. However, it is
often forgotten that the gentry's control was made almost inevitable by
the difficulty of obtaining a secondary education. If attending secondary
schools is related to one's social background and if educational require-
ments are imposed, then the professions that impose such educational re-
quirements will be composed exclusively of those individuals who have
attended such schools. In the case of Britain, control of the military was
not really translated into control of other institutions. In Prussia,
though, the military was able to make policies; indeed members of the
*military were able to have laws passed giving them a special status in the
realm.' ° In the United States, the military has not historically played an
9. See M. JANowITz, THE PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER: A SOCIAL AND POLITICAL POR-
TRAIT 79-103 (1960) [hereinafter cited as JANOWITZ] ; A. VAGTS, A HISTORY OF MILI-
TARISm (rev. ed. 1959); G. CaG, THE POLITICS OF THE PRUssIAN ARmY 1640-1945
(1955) [hereinafter cited as CRAIG].
10. CRAIG, .upra note 9, at 10-22.
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important political role even though it, too, has drawn its officers from a
distinct social group-the upper middle class, especially the upper middle
class of the South. In short, examining social origins for the purpose of
determining organizational control is short-sighted; such a view ignores
the use to which control is put.
Some historians or sociologists might argue that social origins of
generals are important, but the social origins of politicians are also im-
portant. Whenever the origins of the two groups coincide, one can postu-
late the existence of a common ideology within the two groups, a great
facility of communication between the groups and, therefore, a likelihood
that politicians will be co-opted by the military." Such an argument
seriously hinders our understanding of the contemporary situation.
Politicians and generals are usually at least middle-aged and, there-
fore, have substantial careers behind them. Their careers are more likely
to have shaped their thinking, and to a far greater extent, than have their
upbringings. There is thus no assurance of similar understanding. The
fact that both share upper middle-class origins is, by the time these men
are in their fifties, relatively unimportant. Career is likely to have been
an important influence on most professionals. Individuals from widely
differing backgrounds can end up with remarkably similar attitudes, given
effective socialization. 2 Origin, therefore, is unlikely to explain much;
even in cases for which origin seems the most plausible answer."
In short; while the potential for understanding social control existed
in the study of social origins, the realization has fallen short of expecta-
tions. This is disappointing especially when one realizes that virtually
all studies of military organizations find it necessary to discuss social ori-
gins. As has been argued, such a focus is not particularly useful for
11. Or, at a minimum, one can postulate that the military will be better able to
make its views known and accepted, the political leaders already understanding and
accepting the military's views.
12. See generally Garnier, Changing Recruitment Patterns and Organizational
Ideology: The Case of a British Military Academy, 17 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 499 (1972).
13. It has been argued, for example, that the changing recruitment of the officer
corps in Latin America's armies explains the relatively leftist stance taken by several of
that area's military regimes. However, close examination could probably reveal common
career patterns among officers engaged in politics. See generally MILITARY RULE IN
LATIN AMERICA: FUNCTIONS, CONSEQUENCES, AND PERSPECTIVES (P. Schmitter ed.
1973) ; Johnson, The Latin American Military as a Politically Competing Group in
Transitional Society, in THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES 91
(J. Johnson ed. 1962). Indeed, whenever social origins have been studied, they have
usually been shown to have only a very small effect. For instance, the French Army's
involvement in politics was more the result of career experiences than of social origins,
whose contribution is only marginal in explaining the coup of 1958. See J. AMBLER,
SOLDIERS AGAINST THE STATE: THE FRENCH ARMY IN POLITICS 1945-1962, at 128-45
(1966).
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understanding the influence of military organizations on society, and par-
ticularly on politics. By understanding, it should be emphasized, we do
not mean only the kind of intellectual satisfaction that arises from know-
ing how a social system works. Rather, in addition to this intellectual
satisfaction is the need to understand sufficiently the workings of military
organizations so that political leaders can knowingly and accurately ma-
nipulate the organization with certain ends in mind.
The E nd of Limited "Professionalism"
Another related research tradition within sociology is the study of
professions. Military officers are sometimes considered professionals
since they have formal training, are controlled by peers, and so forth.
However, the fact that they have only one setting within which to ex-
ercise their skills reduces the similarities to teachers, doctors and law-
yers. 4 The issue of professionalism is not simply academic; more is in-
volved than arguing about which occupations to include in or exclude
from the professions. Some sociologists have suggested that, in addition
to technical skills, officers should be fully equipped for the complex role
they play in modern societies. In other words military officers, because
they obviously operate within a political context, should become experts
in political matters.15 In fact, a number of officers now hold doctoral
degrees in the social sciences, and a decreasing proportion of the armed
forces is ever engaged in combat." An increasing proportion of the armed
forces is, in fact, engaged in activities that bear only a distant and un-
clear relationship to the country's defense. Some officers serve in the
State Department, and others serve in purely political capacities (con-
gressional liaison officers, for example).
Given that the military is a very large organization which includes
many very talented individuals, it is normal that such individuals should
serve the state in other than military capacities. However, such indi-
viduals still remain within the military hierarchy. Viewed differently,
tax monies are being used to educate officers who will know how to re-
place civilian civil servants, should the need arise. Even more important,
military officers are now perfectly capable of influencing political decision-
makers about matters bearing little relationship to military affairs. Knowl-
edge is not necessarily neutral, yet members of Congress are now being
given information and interpretations that they cannot challenge because
the individuals presenting them possess such high qualifications. These
14. Wilensky, The Professionalization of Everyone?, 80 Am. J. Soc. 137-58 (1964).
15. JANOWITZ, supra note 9.
16. M. JANOWiTZ, THE PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER, ch. 2 (rev. ed. 1971).
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interpretations, in turn, may be erroneous, partly because they are not
subject to scrutiny. This apparent "professionalization" of officers is
taken by some sociologists as evidence that military organizations are
adapting to new circumstances. However, the broadening of the officer's
role may, in fact, constitute a phenomenon that has little to do with the
professions and far more to do with the power of a given organization to
spread its sphere of influence.'7
Despite the probability that power and control are involved here, the
notion of power has been ignored. Only the naive can consistently assume
that professionals always put the interest of clients first. It is therefore
dubious to assume, as so many writers in this area are wont to do, that
increased professionalism is necessarily a guarantee that the civilian sector
will control the military. 8 Rather, as Finer so correctly points out, in-
creased professionalism may simply mean a greater likelihood that the
military will become involved in political matters because professionalism
implies knowledge of what the goal should be as well as how that goal
should be reached.'"
In defense of social scientists studying the military, it should be noted
that political leaders have not often asked for their assistance. In contrast,
the military has long employed social scientists who have turned their at-
tention to such matters as race relations, recruitment, and drug use.2"
Since sociologists, as well as other members of the American society, be-
lieved that the military was, for the most part, being put to a legitimate
use, there was really no need to question the military's control. Indeed, it
is very likely that those sociologists who sought employment in the mili-
tary generally held favorable opinions of the military's general purpose.
Critics of the military stayed outside and often were not sufficiently fa-
miliar with the operation of military organizations to be taken seriously.
The situation changed, and it seems likely that those sociologists who
argue that officers ought to broaden their skills have failed to realize that
such broadening would not necessarily make officers more subservient to
elected officials.2
17. Since there is evidence showing that military personnel are more "expensive*
than their civilian counterparts, it would seem financially advisable to limit officers to-
activities they alone can perform, a point recently made by William Hauser, a serving
officer. See generally W. HAUSER, AM -mcA's ARmy IN CRISIS passim (1973). For a
scholarly discussion of Hauser's thesis, see Lovell, No Tunes of Glory: America's Mili-
tary in the Aftermath of Vietnam, 49 IND. L.J. 698, 713 (1974).
18. E.g., S. HUNTINGTON, THE SOLDIER AND THE STATE: THE THEORY AND POLI-
TICS OF CIVIL-MILTARY RELATIONS, ch. 1 (1957) [hereinafter cited as HUNTINGTON].
19. See generally S. FINER, THE MAN ON HORSEBACK, ch. 1 (1962).
20. See, e.g., HANDBOOK OF MILITARY INSTITUTIONS (R. Little ed. 1971).
21. Among these sociologists, Janowitz is the most prominent. The assumption
they share is that professionalism is in itself a form of control because it involves the
678
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This discussion of professionalism uncovers several important points.
One involves the line between what is military and what is civilian. This
line has become virtually impossible to draw, although having it might
prove very beneficial. The other issue involves a matter usually not dis-
cussed by sociologists, namely, civil-military relations. This confusion
between what is military and what is civilian has arisen because officers
now perform such essentially civilian functions as diplomatic work and
public relations. This expansion of the military into formerly civilian
spheres has not been matched, at least recently, by a similar expansion of
civilians into military matters. Certainly, no one believes that a uniform
or a suit per se is an important element in policy making. Thus the real
question is not who does what, but who controls whom; this question has
not been specifically asked by sociologists.
POLITICAL QUESTIONS
Political scientists have raised the question of organizational control
through their analysis of civil-military relations. Much comparative
work has been done in this area, some of it very informative.22 Political
scientists have not been able to tell political decisionmakers how to control
military organizations, although some have suggested that professional-
ism and its values guarantee civilian dominance.23 Several political sci-
entists have shown that American politicians are no longer controlling
the military because it is already so large and influential that many politi-
cal leaders have acquired vested interests in a strong military establish-
ment.2 The whole idea of a military-industrial complex has been widely
discussed, and the notion has recently received important empirical treat-
ment.25
internalization of certain values: in the American case, values stressing the dominance
of civilian control. The problem with that assumption is that officers genuinely feel
that they are not violating the necessity for civilian control. Rather, they are moving
into a void, a movement made inevitable by changing technological and social factors
and, also, by the general notion that professional ethics require the practitioner to be
prepared for all eventualities. See generally Lang, Military Career Structure-Emnerging
Trends and Alternatives, 17 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 487 (1972).
22. See generally J. HUREWITZ, MIDDLE-EAST POLITICS: THE MILITARY DIMENSION
(1969) ; THE MILITARY REVENUES: CASE STUDY IN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT (H. Bienen
ed. 1968); S. FINER, THE MAN ON HORSEBACK (1962); HUNTINGTON, supra note 18.
23. HUNTINGTON, supra note 18, ch. 1.
24. See generally J. DONOVAN, MILITARISM, U.S.A. (1970) [hereinafter cited as
DONOVAN]; S. MELMAN, PENTAGON CAPITALISM (1970).
25. S. ROSEN, TESTING THE THEORY OF THE MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX (1973).
This is another, albeit related, issue. The theory of a military-industrial complex is im-
portant in this context simply because it argues that the military cannot be controlled
due to the close relationships that exist between civilian and military leaders. There-
fore, no control mechanism exists, either formal or informal, and none can exist due
to the absence of motivation among elected political leaders. However, it must be
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Yet another related issue involves what has been called militarism or
militarization. These notions point to the very large participation of a
significant segment of the American male population in the military. Such
participation exposes American males to military doctrines and ideol-
ogies. 6 Upoi leaving the military, such individuals are responsive to
the claims made by professional military men and thus put no pressure
upon their elected representatives to deny the military's requests. Such
a claim has received very little empirical treatment, and it seems that the
attribution of influence is questionable. Being responsive to military
ideology may be related to one's conservatism just as much as, if not
more than, it is related to one's participation in the military. Further, it
is worth notiig that many societies have had universal conscription for
decades and that such societies are not called militaristic. In the past
the vast majority of males over a certain age in Switzerland and other
European countries were members of the military and, to this day,
all Swiss men must serve. Only extremely radical critics of those
societies have suggested that they were militaristic, and, usually, such
criticisms have involved the nature of the economy far more than the
military itself. It would seem, therefore, that looking at the society at
large will not tell our political representatives how to control organizations,
particularly military organizations.
This does not mean that political scientists are able to tell political
decisionmakers how to control bureaucracies. One important reason is
that few, if any, decisionmakers ever bothered to ask. A review of the
standard texts on public administration clearly reveals that financial con-
trol is often treated as sufficient for organizational control." Some texts
do not even raise that question; they emphasize instead the existence of
statutes as, one assumes, sufficient to obtain such control. It is very likely
that business organizations know how to control their sub-organizational
systems to a far greater extent than does the public sector; this at least is
the impression one receives when comparing business texts with texts on
public administration.
said that, in spite of its popular appeal, the theory of the military-industrial complex
receives little empirical support when closely scrutinized. At best, the evidence is un-
clear. Indeed, once the existence of a military-industrial complex is questioned, one
realizes that large organizations cannot realistically be viewed as monoliths. There
are conflicts within the armed forces and among contractors. At best, one can possibly
show that, in certain instances, the rules of competition are bent and that such limited
competition is made possible by the acquiescence of many elected officials. In its pure
form, which so often implies a conspiracy, the theory of the military-industrial complex
is not really tenable.
26. DONOVAN, supra note 24.
27. E.g., F. NIGRO & L. NIGRO, MODERN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (3d ed. 1973);
I. SHARKANSKY, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (2d ed. 1972).
680
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If one wants answers to the problem of control, then attention should
be paid to the large body of literature dealing with Congress and congres-
sional politics. While in many ways not as systematic as one would like
(at least not as systematic as a sociologist would like), there is little
doubt that such political scientists have not only raised the question ex-
plicitly, but have also provided some tentative' answers.2"
Informal Congressional Constraints: Proposals for Reform
Officially, the General Accounting Office (GAO) is supposed to ex-
ert control over the federal government. 9 ' As an arm of Congress, that
office basically has the function of auditing. The definition of "audit"
seems to be broadening, and that office seems to be moving toward using
the practices that have been standard in the business world for many
years: surveys, effectiveness, duplication of functions, and so on. This
expansion of the audit function is important; but it cannot do justice to
the many other issues that arise when we measure the extent to which
governmental bureaucracies are fulfilling the requirements set by Con-
gress. Obviously, a certain amount of interpretation must occur. How-
ever, there is little doubt that many pieces of legislation originate within
the confines of the bureaucracy. It also seems that members of Congress
and various committees do not always understand the scope of what is
proposed to them.
Part of the reason for their failure to understand is that Congressmen
have three general functions: they legislate, they represent their con-
stituencies, and they control or supervise the Executive. The last function
is usually de-emphasized, particularly since those Congressmen whose
ideology might lead them to criticize the military do not always sit on
committees handling such matters. Especially in the Senate, important
informal norms dictate obedience to specialization ideals; specialization is
thought indispensable and those individuals with the inclination to ques-
tion military policies may in fact never develop the necessary expertise.
Further, specialized committees are usually not staffed with experts; if
28. See generally J. HARRIS, CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF ADmiNisTRATIoN (1964) ;
L. RIESELBACH, CONGRESSIONAL POLITICS (1973) ; Dexter, Congressnzen and the Making
of Military Policy, in NEW PERSPECIIVES ON THE HoUsE OF REPRESENTATIVES 175 (R.
Peabody & N. Polsby eds. 1969). The recommendations to be made draw heavily on
this literature.
29. See R. BROWN, THE GAO: UNTAPPED SOURCE OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER
(1970).
30. Indeed, a very recently proposed reform of Congress would precisely divide the
work of committees into two parts, one involving legislation, the other supervision. It
seems reasonable to assume that a substantial part of that supervision would be effected
by a specialized staff or, possibly, by an expanded GAO. See RIESELBACH, supra note
28, at 372-78 (1973).
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they have experts, they have an insufficient number of them. As a result,
the executive branch is often unchallenged. Obviously, the assumption
here is that legislators want to challenge executive policies. While chal-
lenge is not always necessary, it seems that many Congressmen are only
too willing to support administration policies, and this acquiescence often
stems from their ignorance of the matters at hand. Far larger and more
professionalized staff on congressional committees might alleviate some
of these problems. Those who advocate more professionalized military
personnel should also urge that legislators employ professionals whose
function would be to scrutinize all the implications of military proposals.
This kind of activity is not, in itself, new; nevertheless, it should be vastly
expanded in scope and become an integral part of the appropriations
process.
It should also be noted that Congress will not be able to control the
military if that bureaucracy is not organized along lines which facilitate
such control. A little-known report states:
Effective civilian control is impaired by a generally excessive
centralization of decision-making authority at the level of the
Secretary of Defense. The Secretary's ability to selectively
delegate authority and decentralize management, while still re-
taining personal authority on major policy issues of the Depart-
ment, is seriously inhibited by the present organizational struc-
ture."'
The notion of control, therefore, goes far beyond the issue discussed here.
It also includes, in all -likelihood, a rather substantial reorganization of
the Pentagon to enable Congress to control the various Secretaries who,
in turn, will be able to control their various departments effectively. 2
CONCLUSIONS
The assumption implicit in this discussion is that the military should
be controlled by elected officials because it tends to involve itself in matters
far beyond the scope of national defense. If the lines between civilian
and military matters are too indistinct, we might also want to examine
congressional functions for part of the explanation. Because no systematic
control mechanism exists, individual Congressmen have long involved
themselves in details that clearly fall within the purview of the military."
31. BLUE RIBBON DEFENSE PANEL, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE ON THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 1 (1970).
32. See generally id.
33. In addition, some Congressmen and Senators have made arrangements with
senior officers such that in return for equipment appropriations, bases could be located
682
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If political leaders want to control the military, they must be willing
to trust generals and admirals sufficiently to let them run that organiza-
tion. This is a notion that does not necessarily invalidate the control we
have advocated in this discussion. On the contrary, if policies are made
clear and if accountability constitutes an integral part of the control that
has been advocated here, then generals can become far more effective in
carrying out their duties because political considerations will no longer
be necessary. They will have been considered by political leaders or,
perhaps, by members of the State Department.
The other responsibility of Congress is more complex and probably
applies more to the President and the Cabinet than to Congress itself.
This responsibility involves- listening to the advice given by military spe-
cialists when such advice is needed. There is no need to maintain an
elaborate military establishment if the opinions of those charged with
running it are not sought when needed. Obviously, at no time must our
political leaders lose their critical abilities; yet there has been a tendency
in the recent past to disregard the military advice of those competent to
give it. Conversely, there has been too great a willingness on the part of
military leaders to agree that any operation was possible.
3 4
Not surprisingly, this discussion has returned to the topic of profes-
sionalism. More sharply drawn lines between the military and the civilian
domains would constitute an important improvement upon the present
situation. Subsequently, the development of structures to improve the
information flow to political decisionmakers would benefit both the mili-
tary and Congress.
It can be hoped-and there are strong indications that such efforts
will be forthcoming in the near future-that sociologists and political
scientists will raise questions regarding organizational control. The early
writers on bureaucracy were struck by the social power concentrated in
bureaucracies.35 That impression is no -less valid today. Obviously, the
kind of detailed work on communications, organizational structures, span
of control, and so forth, that has characterized the field must continue.
We must not, however, lose sight of the fact that bureaucracies are in-
struments, and that instruments must be controlled. Scholars can play
an important role by sensitizing elected officials to the need for such con-
trol. The emergence of military sociology as a viable specialty within
sociology may result in examinations of power, since that subject is not
in a certain district, even if that location made no military or organizational sense.
34. See generally S. LooRy, DEFEATED: INSIDE AMERICA'S MILITARY MACHINE,
pt. III (1973), reviewed in Lovell, supra note 17.
35. See notes 1-5 mtpra & text accompanying.
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being addressed in organizational sociology. Furthermore, there is a
growing awareness among sociologists that their findings must become
more policy oriented, that is, that the variables they isolate must be subject
to manipulation rather than be merely descriptive. It should also be added
that the social research done under military auspices can be used by out-
siders to help in controlling the military. However, before that can oc-
cur, legislators must realize that such control is necessary and, just as
important, that it does not imply meddling.
